Muliirobof coordinaiion, i f made efficieni and robust, promises high impact on auiomation. The challenge is io eMble robots ro work iogeiher in an inielligeni manner io execuie a global iask The market approach has had considerable success in ihe muliiroboi coordination domain. This paper invesiigafes the effects of inrroducing opponunisiic opiimizaiion wiih leaders f a enhance market-based muliirobof coordinaiion. Leaders are able io optimize wiihin subgroups of robois by collecfing infomiion about their fasks and s f a m , and re-allocating ihe tasks wiihin the subgroup in a mare profirable manner. The presenred work considers rhe effecfs of a leader optimizing a single subgroup, and some effecfs of muliiple leaders optimizing overlapping subgroups. The implemeniaiions were iesied on a variation of ihe disiributed iraveling salesman problem. Presented results show ihoi global costs can be reduced and hence rask allocation can be improved, uiilizing leaders.
Introduction
The growing demand for robotic solutions to increasingly complex and varied problems has dictated that a single robot is no longer the best solution for many .application domains: instead, teams of robots must coordinate intelligently for successful task execution. Driven by these demands, many research effons have focused on the challenge of multirobot coordination. Dias and Stentz [2] present a detailed description of multirobot application domains and their demands and show that robot teams are more effective than a single robot in many application domains. Simply increasing the number of robots assigned to a task does not necessarily solve a problem more efficiently; multiple robots must cwperate to achieve high efficiency. The difficulty arises in coordinating many robots to perform a complex, global task.
Dynamic environments, malfunctioning robots, and multiple user requirements add to the complexity of the multirobot coordination problem. Dias and Stentz [Z] explore some of these issues, and present some of the principal effons in this field of research.
One approach is to design the team such that a single robot or central computer acts as a "leader" and is responsible for planning the actions of the entire group. The principal advantage of such centralized approaches is that they allow optimal planning. However, they suffer from several disadvantages including sluggish response to dynamic conditions, intractable solutions for large teams, communication difficulties, and the leader becoming a central point of failure.
Local and distributed approaches address these problem by distributing the planning responsibilities amongst all members of the team. Each robot operates 0-7803-7398-7/02/$17.00 WOO2 IEEE 271 4
independently, relying on its local sensor information.
Many research effons have modeled distributed systems inspired by biology, physics, and economics. The principal drawback of distributed approaches is that they often result in highly sub-optimal solutions because all plans are based solely on local information.
Recently, negotiation-based and economylmarket-based multirobot coordination has gained popularity. This work in multirobot coordination draws from the software agents literature that began with Smith's Contract Net Protocol [9] , its extension by Sandholm and Lesser [7] , and the general concepts of marketaware agents developed by Wellman and W m a n [12] . These concepts have since been extended to conwol a variety of multiagent (and more recently multirobot) systems. Golfarelli and Rizzi [SI proposed a swapbased negotiation protocol for multirobot coordination that restricted negotiations to task-swaps. Stentz and Dias [IO] proposed a more capable market-based approach for multirobot coordination which aims to opporhmistically introduce pockets of centralized optimal planning into a distributed system, thereby exploiting the desirable properties of both distributed and centralized approaches. This work introduced the methodology of applying market mechanisms to intra-team robot coordination (i.e. in typically non-competitive environments) as opposed to competitive multirobot domains and competitive inter-agent interactions in domains such as E-commerce. Simulation results using this approach were produced by Dias and Stentz [3] , and proven robot results were presented by Thayer et al. [I 11, and Zlot et al. [13] . A brief introduction to this approach is presented here. 
2.3
Self Organization
Conspicuously absent from the market approacb is a rigid, topdown hierarchy. Instead, the robots organize themselves in a way that is mutually beneficial. Since the aggregate profit amassed by the individuals is Adaptation directly tied to the success of the task, this selforganization yields the best results. Consider a group of ten robots. An eleventh robot, A, offers its services as their leader. It does not become their leader by coercion or decree, but by convincing the group that they will make more profit by following its advice than by acting individually or in subgroups. A does this by investigating "plans" for utilizing all ten robots. If A comes up with a truly good plan, it will maximize profit across the whole group,. The prospective leader can use this large profit to bid for the senices of the group members, and of c o w , retain a portion of the profit for itself. Note that all relevant robots will have to commit to the plan before the plan can be sold. The leader may be bidding not only against the individuals' plans, but also against group plans produced by other prospective leaders. Note that the leader acts both as a benevolent and a self-interested agent since it receives personal compensation for efforts benefiting the entire group.
But there is a limit to this organization. As the group becomes larger, the combinatorics become intractable and the process of gathering all of the relevant information to produce a good plan becomes increasingly difficult. A leader will realize this when it can no longer convince its subjects (via bidding for their services) to follow its plans.
Contribution
The work presented in this paper explores some effects of opportunistic optimization with leaders in marketbased multirobot coordination. Funhermore, this work addressed one of the key limitations of our implementation of this approach thus far: the reshiction of negotiations to single-party, single-task deals. In many cases, this restriction limits the global cost reduction, since the robots do not have the negotiation tools to reason their way out of shallow, local minima.
The work presented here extends these tools to permit multi-party and multi-task deals with better global cost reduction potential.
Optimizing with Leaders
An important contribution of this work is the development of a "leader" role that allows a robot with the necessary resources to assess the current plans of a group of robots and provide more optimal plans for the group. The leader can gain knowledge of the group's cnrrent state via communication or some form of observation. A prospective leader can use the profits generated by an optimized plan to bid for the services of the group members, and retain a portion of the profit for itself. The leader may bid not only against the individuals' plans, but also against group plans produced by other prospective leaders. Centralized and distributed approaches are two extremes along a continuum. The introduction of leaders allows the market-based approach to slide along this continuum in the direction of improved profitability in an oppormnistic manner. In this work we implement a preliminary version of the leader capability by means of a combinatorial exchange, as proposed in [?I.
1 Clustering for Multi-Task Proeessiug
The capability to negotiate multi-task deals greatly enhances the market approach because it allows a robot to escape some local minima in task allocation solutions. However, if the robots hid on every possible combination of tasks, the number of bids submitted will grow exponentially with the number of tasks. Consequently, processing these bids will be impossible for more than a few tasks. Hence, some form of clustering algorithm is necessary to determine the clusters of tasks to bid on. The possibilities for such clustering algorithms are numerous [6] .
The clustering algorithm used in this work is chosen to ensure a span in size (from single-task clusters to a wholly inclusive cluster) and task membership (i.e. ensure that every task is included in at least one cluster). Son the edge list from lowest to highest cost.
Form the fust group of clusters by creating a singletask cluster for each task on offer.
For cluster sizes ranging from 2 to N, recursively form new clusters by adding the next best available edge (an edge is unavailable if it is either already included in a previous cluster or if the edge connects two tasks which are not included in any of the previous clusters) to a cluster in the previous cluster-list. (Note, when new cluste~s are formed.
all previous clusters are preserved).
Thus, recursively form a forest of minimum spanning trees (MSTs) [I] ranging in size from 1 to N. This algorithm can be applied in general to determine which tasks are best dealt with in clusters, without computing every possible cluster. Suitable variations of this algorithm (or others) can be chosen to enable multitask negotiations in different task domains. The presented work is verified on a multi-depot distributed traveling salesman problem (TSP), and hence, the MSTs are decomposed into t o m as follows. If a newly added edge breaks the continuity of the tour, the MST is adjusted by removing one of the edges connecting to the newly added edge and adding the necessary edge to preserve the continuity of the tour with the least addition to the cost of the tour. Note that this change stiU preserves the bounds of the MST, which guarantees that the cost of the tour does not exceed twice the optimal cost. This holds m e for metric cost spaces where the triangle inequality is preserved.
Allowing robots to include the offloading of an owned cluster when bidding to accept a new cluster of tasks further enhances the bidding capability of the robots.
Combinatorial Exchange for Multi-Party
A combinatorial exchange (a market where bidders can jointly buy and sell a combination of goods and services within a single bid) is chosen to enable multi-party optimizations for a team A combinatorial exchange enables a leader to locally optimize the task assignments of a subgroup of robots and to potentially achieve a greater global cost reduction. Many researchers including Sandholm and Suri [SI have presented valuable insight on how to efficiently implement and clear combinatorial exchanges for E-commerce applications. However, many of these tools are relatively complex and are not used in this work for simplicity. Instead, the basic recommendation of searching a binary bid tree is applied. The chosen implementation for clearing the combinatorial exchange in this work is a depth fust search on a binary tree where each node of the tree represents a bid and the binary aspect of the tree represents accepting or rejecting that bid.
The tree is pruned to disallow accepting multiple bids from any single bidder, and to disallow exchanging of any single task more than once. Note that the pruning does not affect the solution except by improving the runtime.
The preliminary version of the leader role in the market approach is implemented as follows. A leader queries surrounding robots to discover what tasks they have to offer and their current states, and re-allxates tasks within the group using the combinatorial exchange mechanism. Note that this is just one way in which the leader can reduce the cost within the group (and thereby the global cost). Other schemes could involve the leader using different mechanisms to re-distribute tasks and even generating new tasks to coordinate the group more efficiently. Moreover, some tasks (for example, cwperative automated construction and cooperative maneuvering of large objects) may require tight coordination where a leader has to closely monitor the progress of individual team members and accordingly direct the efforts of other members of the team.
Competing Local Groups
When leaden are allowed to oppormnistically optimize sub-pups, occasions could arise where two leaders are in competition for the services of the robots that overlap between the two groups. If a robot bids on tasks from both leaders, it could win both bids and be unable to perform them or find it unprofitable to do so. There are several ways to address this "synchronization" issue.
For example, broken deals with a penalty can be allowed, or bids can be stamped with an expiration time during which they are valid and offers can be dealt with on a first-come-fmt-serve or last-come-fust-serve basis.
optimizations
In the work presented here, the groups are allowed to negotiate in round robin fashion, thus forcing serial synchronization.
Experimentation
The proposed multi-task and multi-party enhancements are developed and tested in a simulated distributed sensing task A group of robots, located at different stariing positions in a known simulated world, are assigned the task of visiting a set of pre-selected observation points. This problem is a variation of the multi-depot distributed traveling salesman problem, where the observation points are the cities to visit Note that many multirobot application domains require an effective solution to the distributed waveling salesman problem. The costs are the lengths of the straigbt-line paths between locations, interpreted as money. Let q be the cost for the ja robot to visit the i'h city from the +la) city in its tour (where the Oa city is the starting location).
The robot cost function for the jfi robot is computed as follows:
1-1
where n, is the number of cities in the tow for robot j
The team cost function is:
where rn is the number of robots.
The team revenue and robot revenue functions are determined by the negotiated prices.
All robots (bidders) adopt the same simplistic strategy of bidding a fixed 10% markup above the cost of completing the task According to this strategy, if an announced task costs e to execute, a robot computes its bid as 1.1 e.
Thus, the robots bid for each city based on their estimated costs to visit that city. Similarly, if a robot offers up a task that will cost it e to execute, in an anempt to buy the services of another robot to complete that task, the maximum price it offers for this service is set as 0.9 e. Tasks and robot positions are randomly generated within a lOOxl00 world, and initial task allocations are made by randomly distributing the tasks among the robots. Heterogeneous robot capabilities are considered by restricting some robots' capabilities such that they can only process single-task (ST) deals, while other robots can process multi-task (MT) deals. Robots capable of playing leader roles are allowed the additional capability of performing multi-party (MP) optimizations via either a single-goods exchange or a combinatorial exchange, depending on their capability. 
Two-Party, Single-Task (TF'ST) Negotiations
In this case, once the initial random task assignments are made, each of the robots, in turn, offers alI its assigned tasks to all the other robots, in turn. Thus . .
Figure I: TPST Illustration
Each bidder then submits a bid for each task In order to estimate the additional cost of inserting a task into its queue, the bidder uses the cluster generation algorithm described above to generate an MST with its current queue of tasks plus the offered task and computes the cost difference between the resulting and original queues. The offerer accepts the most profitable bid it receives. The wst of the offerer's resulting queue is computed by removing from its queue the task that was transferred tbmugh the winning bid, clustering the remaining tasks using the clustering algorithm, and computing the cost of the resulting queue. Hence, in the TPST scenario, only single-task (ST) deals are considered, and pain of robots continue to negotiate amongst themselves in round-robin fashion until no new, mutually profitable deals are possible. Therefore, negotiations cease once the system settles into a local minimum for the global cost function.
Two-party, Multi-Task (TPMT) Negotiations
In this case, the previous case is repeated with clusters of tasks being the atomic unit of the negotiations as shown in Figure 2 . That is, the initial assignments are followed by each of the robots, in rum, offering all of its assigned tasks to all the other robots, in am. The robots then bid for clusten of these tasks. Once again, costs are computed by using the clustering algorithm to cluster all tasks under consideration and compute the cost of the resulting queues, and negotiations are always between two robots.
Leader Performing Multi-Party Single-Task
A leader, whose capability is restricted to dealing in sinele-task deals. is introduced in this case. The leader
(MPST) Optimizations
Here, the previous case was repealed with the added capability of the leader to process MT bids as shown in 
Results and Discussion
The results for the experiments described above are shown below. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the final tom of each robot for a 2-roboL l@city TSP and a 4-robot, 10-city TSP respectively. In both figures, the robots are shown as circles and the cities are shown as squares.
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As evident from these results, on average, an MTcapable leader can improve the profit of the group significantly. An STcapahle leader can only improve the profit of the group on average for groups of robots where there are at most 50% MT-capable robots.
Tabk 3: Performance averaged over 100 randomly generated 4-robot (heterogeneous), 20-task TSPs Figure 7 and Table 4 illustrate preliminary results for the competing subgroup scenario. The subgroups of robots are circled in Figure 7 , which depicts the results of a single rue IO a System. Proceedings of the 6" International Conference combinatorial exchange. Note that the leader is not on Intelligent Autonomous Systems (lAS-6). selling the achrnl cluster of t a s k j u s t a plan for which tasks to cluster. The exchange could then buy all of the component tasks, sell off the resultant cluster, and pay a I41 Gerkey, B. P. and Matarit. M. I. Submitted 2001. Sold! fee IO the leader. The presented results indicate that the ManCet methods for multi-mboz control. lEEE benefit from the abiliv-to cluster tasks and participate in multi-task negotiations exceeds the benefit from the ability to perfom multi-party negotiations. Leaders could also use other approaches to generate plans for a subgroup of robots. Finally, a leader could simply act as a means of enabling aade between subgroups of robots who are otherwise unable to communicate, thus enriching the possible trades.
Conclusions and Future Work
Presented results show that leaders can considerably reduce global costs in market-based multirobot coordination. Initial experiments for optimizing within robot sub-goups with leaders also proved promising. Future work includes implementing these capabilities on a robot team and further extensions of the market approach.
Proposed enhancements include more detailed analysis of optimizing with leaders, dealing with time constraints, and experimentation with different task domains. The goal of this work is to produce an efficient and robust market-based multirobot coordination archifecture.
